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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SANDRA POLL,
CaseNo.20100765-CA

Petitioner-Appellee,
V.

JAMES COOK POLL,
Respondent-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
Appellant, James Cook Poll, appeals from the trial court's decision
concluding that approximately 37 acres of land in Wasatch County, Utah and
related water rights purchased by the parties during the marriage (the "Wasatch
property") was not marital property subject to equitable division between the
parties, as reflected in the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Supplemental Decree of Divorce entered on August 13, 2010. R. 334-43, 34447. This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the Wasatch
property was not marital property subject to equitable division between the parties?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An appellate court will make changes to "a
trial court's property division determination in a divorce action only if there was a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Olson v.
Olson, 2010 UT App 22, ^ 7, 226 P.3d 751. The trial court's factual findings on
which its determination is based are reviewed clear error. Id. at ^f 9. This issue
was preserved for review by counsel's argument to the trial court and by the
stipulation of the parties. (R. 321, 332; May 12, 2010 Transcript of Proceedings
("Transcript") at 198-200;l May 13, 2010 Transcript of Proceedings ("Transcript
II") at 4-8; May 18, 2010 Transcript of Proceedings ("Transcript III") at 8-10.)

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Determinative statutory provisions are included in Addendum A.

1

None of the three transcripts provided as part of the record to counsel by the trial
court included a record number on them. Accordingly, citations to these items will
be cited as noted in the text: "Transcript", "Transcript II", and "Transcript III".
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

On January 9, 2009, Sandra filed a Petition for Divorce in the Fourth

District Court for Utah County. (Record ("R.") at 1-3.)
2.

On January 28, 2009, James filed his Answer to the Petition. (R. at 5-

3.

Trial of the case was held on May 12 and 13, 2010. (R. at 321, 322.)

4.

At the conclusion of the first day of trial, the court bifurcated the

v.)

proceedings and concluded that the Wasatch property belonged to Sandra as
separate property and was not marital property, although, through his efforts at
protecting the property's value, James had earned a "rather nominal" equitable
interest therein. (R. at 321; Transcript at 116-17, 194-97, 201-03.)
5.

On the second day of trial, instead of evidence being presented to the

Court concerning the remaining property division issues, the parties reached a
resolution of the remaining issues. The terms of that resolution were stated on the
record and included, among others, that the automobiles were to be divided
between the parties, and that James would be awarded his retirement accounts, all
of the StimTrainer, stock various pieces of personal property, and a specified sum
of cash. In exchange, James conceded the "nominal interest" in the Wasatch
property as well as certain other specific property, but he specifically reserved his

3

right to appeal the trial court's determination that the Wasatch property was not
marital property. (Transcript II at 4-8.)
6.

Thereafter, the Court took testimony from Sandra concerning

jurisdiction and the legal grounds for a divorce. (R. at 322; Transcript II 10-11.)
Based thereon, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re
Bifurcated Divorce and a Decree of Divorce that dissolved the parties' marriage,
restored Sandra's premarital name, and reserved all other issues. (R. at 325-26,
327-28.)
7.

On May 18, 2010, the trial court called counsel for the parties into

chambers, without the parties being present, and held an on-the-record session
during which it supplemented the record as to its reasons for denying James an
interest in the Wasatch County property. (Transcript III.) During that session, the
trial court included among its bases for the decision, the idea that James had
potentially fraudulently conveyed the property to Sandra to avoid having it used
for the benefit of creditors.

In particular, the trial court concluded that James had

acted inequitably and therefore could not be heard to complain of the denial of his
equitable request. (Transcript III at 4-10.) In addition to the Court's
supplementation, during the in-chambers hearing, counsel for the parties added an
additional stipulation concerning the allocation of a debt that had not been raised
during the trial. (Transcript III at 10-11.)

4

8.

Thereafter, in conformity with its bench rulings during the trial and at

the in-chambers hearing, and consistent with the stipulations of the parties, on
August 13, 2010, the trial court entered Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ("Findings") and Supplemental Decree of Divorce ("Decree").
(R. at 334-43, 344-47.)
9.

The Findings included the following specific findings of fact:

15. For the reasons more specifically set forth hereafter the
court finds the [Wasatch] property to be separate, and is
awarded to Sandra Poll.
16. The court finds the $2,253,394.99, and the down payment
of $50,000, with respect to the Wasatch County property, came
exclusively from the Petitioner's trust, (Transcript dated May
12, 2010, page 58 line 17, Transcript dated 18 May page 5 line
2). This purchase of thirty-seven (37) acres, and a water right
comprised of 52 shares in Daniel Irrigation Company, was
purchased in Wasatch County on or about July 20, 2006.
17. The court finds the real estate purchase contract initiated on
May 18, 2006 designated the buyer as James C. and Sandra
Poll. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2)

18. The court finds the Warranty Deed from grantor, Ross
Ewing Bethers and Juanita K. Bethers, to the grantee, James C.
Poll and Sandra Poll as husband and wife, was signed on the
20th day of July 2006. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3)
19. The court finds the Warranty Deed was signed by James C.
Poll and Sandra Poll on the 16th day of March 2007 with James
C. Poll and Sandra Poll as grantors, conveying the Wasatch
County property to Sandra Poll. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4)
20. The court finds there is no dispute with respect to the
source of the money for the purchase of the Wasatch County
property. The source was Petitioner's, Sandra Poll's, trust.
(Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 58 line 23)
21. The court finds Mr. Poll asserted that a one-half interest in
this property had been gifted to him. (Transcript dated May 12,
2010 page 190, line 11) On direct examination, he claimed that
the property was a gift. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page
163 line 19)
22. The court finds Mr. Poll claimed the reason the parties
signed the Warranty Deed on the 16th day of March 2007 was
out of concern that potential creditors may be able to reach him
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personally, acting as President of StimTrainer. He testified
"That was the sole reason for me" for the transfer of the
property to Mrs. Poll. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010, page
166 line 3, and Transcript dated 18 May 2010 page 5 lines 716)
23. The court finds Mrs. Poll, the Petitioner, testified that she
never intended to make a gift of the Wasatch County property
to Mr. Poll. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 44 lines 1314) and that shortly after the documents were signed she
became "terribly concerned." (Transcript dated May 12, 2010
page 44 line 19, Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 5 line 17)
24. The court finds that it is undisputed (Transcript dated May
12, 2010 page 201) that the parties made considerable effort
throughout the course of their marriage to keep their assets
separate. The court finds they did join in terms of actual
operating expenses such as groceries and household goods, but
there was a continued separation of accounts. (Transcript dated
May 18, 2010 page 5 lines 17-23)
25. The court finds the evidence unpersuasive that Petitioner,
Mrs. Poll, intended to make a gift of any portion of the Wasatch

7

County property and the accompanying water right property to
Mr. Poll. It is undisputed that Mrs. Poll paid the entire
purchase price of approximately $2,300,000.
26. The court finds what is more specific and clear about the
testimony from Mr. Poll that it was his intent to convey this
property from his estate for purposes of sheltering it from
creditors, with the specific intent of removing it from his estate
getting it out of his estate, and restoring it to hers. (Transcript
dated May 12, 2010, page 202 line 24 through page 203 line 5).
27. Therefore, the court finds the stronger evidence is that of an
intention to keep the property separate. In this regard the court
finds the evidence of Sandy Poll to be credible, and the
evidence offered by Mr. Poll to be not credible.
28. The court finds there was little or no credible testimony
from the defendant regarding the transfer that the parties agreed
the title, though transferred to Petitioner, would still remain
joint marital property in terms of specific reference during the
discussions. (Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 5 lines 1924).

29. The court finds it would not be unreasonable to conclude
that Mr. Poll's objective would constitute a potentially
fraudulent conveyance. (Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 6
line5). The title transfer reflects his intention that his estate not
include the Wasatch County Property and that it would be the
separate property of Mrs. Poll. However, now he seeks before a
court of equity to claim a one-half interest in that property.

[Paragraphs 30-32 omitted. ]

33. The court finds a similar principle applies here. Mr. Poll
claims to have transferred the property for an improper purpose.
Specifically, " . . . by his own testimony [Mr. Poll] has
explained the intention of the parties by agreement to convey
this property from his estate for the purposes of sheltering it
from creditors with the specific intent of getting it out of his

2

In the omitted paragraphs of the Findings (R. 335-36), the Court analyzed the
case of Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, 95 P.3d 1221. Because this analysis of a
prior legal case, although contributing to the trial court's thought process in
making its findings, did not actually constitute findings of fact, it is not included
here.

0

estate and putting it in hers." (Transcript dated May 12, 2010
page 203 lines 1-5)
34. Now Mr. Poll asks a court of equity to reform the very
deed, which in his view, and if not in his view the court's view,
had as its objective an improper purpose. He cannot be heard to
complain even if there had been no actual fraudulent
conveyance. (Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 10 lines 35).
35. The court finds based upon the facts as the court has found,
combined with the overall history of the respective marital
contributions, including the substantial losses incurred, and then
by weighing the equities, the court finds it would not be unjust
for Mrs. Poll to retain the Wasatch County property and water
right as her separate property.
(R. at 334-39.)
10.

In the Decree, the trial court ordered that the "Wasatch County

property and accompanying water are awarded to Petitioner, Sandra Poll, nka
Sandra Straub, as her separate property." (R. at 345.)
11.

On September 8, 2010, James filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 351-53.)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS3
Testimony of Sandra Poll
1.

Sandra Poll's first husband was killed in the 9/11 terrorist attack on

New York City on September 11, 2001. (Transcript at 33-34.) As a result, she
received in excess of $4.8 million from multiple sources. (Transcript at 35.)
Sandra placed most of those funds into a trust account in her name and distributed
an unspecified amount to her first husband's children and step children.
(Transcript at 35-36.)
2.

Exhibit 1 reflects various estate planning documents that Sandra had

prepared to help her manage these funds. (R. 324, Exhibit 1.) James was never
made a trustee of the Trust Account; nor was he given a durable power of attorney

As noted above, the parties stipulated to the division of all of the property at issue
except for the Wasatch property. This stipulation was made after the trial court
had ruled that the Wasatch property was Sandra's premarital, separate property.
Accordingly, the parties' stipulation recognized that the division of property
included within the terms of that stipulation (that is, all the property except the
Wasatch property) was equitable. Accordingly, there is no need to evaluate the
stipulated division in order to evaluate its appropriateness. Because he is
challenging the trial court's findings of fact concerning the Wasatch property,
however, James is required to marshal the evidence presented to the trial court that
might in any way support the trial court's determination on that issue.
Accordingly, in this factual statement, James includes a description of a significant
portion of the evidence adduced concerning the parties' other property.
On occasion, references to James's testimony will also be included in this section
when it supports or coincides with Sandra's testimony. In such instances, the
citation will include "accord" before the transcript cite.
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to act for Sandra, even though she had others filling these roles. (Transcript at 78;
accord Transcript at 162-63.)
3-

The parties became engaged in December 2004 and married on April

8, 2005. (Transcript at 41, 75.) At that time, Sandra intended for the marriage to
last for the rest of her life and to provide both parties' children a family
environment. (Transcript at 75-76; accord Transcript at 121-22.)
4.

During her marriage to James, Sandra had access to and used three

accounts. (Transcript at 40; R. 324 Exhibit 5.) Specifically, the Sandra Poll Trust
Account (hereinafter referred to as the "Trust Account") was the trust that Sandra
had set up for the funds referred to above. (Transcript at 40.) The Sandra Poll
Personal Checking Account (hereinafter referred to "Sandra's Personal Account")
was a checking account that Sandra had established prior to the parties' marriage.5
(Transcript at 40-41.) Sandra's Personal Account was funded entirely by funds
drawn from the Trust Account. (Transcript at 40-41.) A joint checking account
("Joint Account") was established shortly before the parties married and was used
primarily for James' expenses during the marriage. (Transcript at 40.) According
to Sandra, she paid most of the other expenses such as family related expenses and

5

In the interest of full accuracy, the testimony was that Sandra did change the
banks that Sandra's Personal Account was with after the parties married.
(Transcript at 41.) James does not assert that the change in banks affected in any
way the nature of Sandra's Personal Account as premarital, separate property.

1?

most of the credit card bills out of Sandra's Personal Account. (Transcript at 4041.)
5.

Sandra initially asserted that all of the funds that went into the Joint

Account were derived from her Trust Account funds (Transcript at 40) but later
acknowledged that some significant amounts were provided by James (Transcript
at 78-79).
6.

James never had his name on or signing authority on either the Trust

Account or Sandra's Personal Account. The only way he could receive funds from
those was to ask Sandra to withdraw them and give them to him. (Transcript at 8081.) In contrast, the parties opened the Joint Account together and both had their
names on it and had signing authority on it. (Transcript at 84.)
7.

At the time of the marriage, Sandra owned a condominium in

Massachusetts. (Transcript at 41-42.) Shortly before the marriage, Sandra
purchased a home in Georgia for $575,000. (Transcript at 42.) Sandra made the
mortgage payments on the Georgia home for a number of months and then paid off
the entire balance.6 (Transcript at 42.) After the parties and their children lived in

Although Sandra did not expressly so testify, it was clear that she meant, and
James conceded before the trial court, that all of the funds used to pay for the
Georgia home were Sandra's premarital funds, either directly from the Trust
Account or from the proceeds of the sale of her Massachusetts condominium.
(Transcript at 16-17.)

n

the home for about three years, the Georgia home was eventually sold for a loss of
$150,000. (Transcript at 42-43.)
8.

On May 18, 2006, the parties signed a standard Real Estate Purchase

Contract ("REPC") for the purchase of the Wasatch property for a purchase price
of $2,300,000 ($50,000 of which was to be paid immediately as earnest money).
(Transcript at 43; R. 324, Exhibit 2.) The REPC listed "James C. and Sandra Poll"
as the buyer and included the initials and signatures of each throughout the
document. (Transcript at 93-94; R. 324, Exhibit 2.)
9.

On July 20, 2006, the parties completed the purchase of the Wasatch

property and received a warranty deed from the sellers. (Transcript at 43-44; R.
324, Exhibit 3.) The deed listed the grantees as "James C. Poll and Sandra Poll,
Husband and Wife". (Transcript at 94-95; R. 324, Exhibit 3.) All of the $2.3
million used to purchase the Wasatch property came from the Trust Account.
(Transcript at 43, 93.)
10.

Sandra's purpose in purchasing the Wasatch property was for her and

James and their children to live on as a family. (Transcript at 47, 96; accord
Transcript at 158.) Each of the parties had plans for the Wasatch property: Sandra
wanted to grow an orchard and James wanted build a barn. (Transcript at 96-97.)
Sandra named a portion of the Wasatch property after James, calling it "James
Knoll." (Transcript at 97.)
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11.

Sandra testified that James' name was included on the REPC and the

deed because "[w]e were married, and quite frankly, I hadn't - 1 didn't think about
it at the time." (Transcript at 44.) She denied that she intended to make a gift to
James of half the value of the Wasatch property. (Transcript at 44.) Then, she
testified that she became concerned about his name being on the property shortly
after they signed. (Transcript at 44.) Specifically, she testified:
Q. Did there come a time when you became concerned about the fact
that his name was on the property?
A I was terribly concerned.
Q My question is did there come a time?
A Yes.
Q When was that time?
A Shortly after we signed the Q Why were you concerned?
A Because I was afraid of just a situation as this, that - and my
parents had told me that this could happen as well as my trustee.
They said these documents need to be in your name.
(Transcript at 44-45.)
12.

On cross examination, this same issue was covered and Sandra

testified as follows:

Q Did you at any time object to having the property put in both your
names?
A I don't believe at any time I actually stated that objection, but after
the fact I was - it became a terrible concern of mine, as I stated
before.
Q And that was because your parents were advising you that that was
a bad move?
A Well, I knew it was a bad move.

Q . . . Your parents both advised you that it was bad for you to have it
in both names?
A Yes. And my trustee as well.
Q And when did your trustee give you that advice?
A I can't give you a specific date. I don't know.
Q Before - before or A Before.
Q - the purchase?
A Yes. Before and after. Yes.
(Transcript at 95-96.)
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13.

The parties had considered entering into a prenuptial agreement but

decided not to execute one. (Transcript at 45.) Sandra testified that she did not
insist on one because James convinced her not to. (Transcript at 45.)
14.

On March 16, 2007, the parties jointly deeded the Wasatch property to

Sandra Poll. (Transcript at 45-46, 98-99; R. 324, Exhibit 4.) The reason that
James gave for deeding the property to Sandra was to avoid difficulties arising out
of James' role as an officer of StimTrainer.7 (Transcript at 46-47, 99-100.) Sandra
acknowledged that this was James' sole purpose in deeding the Wasatch property
to Sandra in her name only and that she was aware of it at the time. (Transcript at
99-100.)
15.

Sandra asserted that she did not ask James to deed the property to her

earlier than that because she was afraid of an argument ensuing and because James
was on occasion "physical." (Transcript at 47.) Sandra felt "[t]remendous relief
when the property was transferred to her name. (Transcript at 47.)
16.

Sandra testified that she regularly paid the water bills associated with

the Wasatch property but acknowledged that James had paid one such bill for
about $400. (Transcript at 48-49; accord Transcript at 166-68.)
7

•

StimTrainer, Inc. is discussed in more detail below.
o

James denied that any physical altercation was ever started by him; instead, any
physical action taken by him was in response to Sandra's physical outbursts or
those of her son, Michael. (Transcript at 181-87.)
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17.

StimTrainer, Inc. is a company that makes an alternative medical

device. (Transcript at 49.) Sandra was the record owner of 90% of shares in
StimTrainer, which she obtained from Tom Grant. (Transcript at 49-50, 100.)
Sandra made over $350,000 in direct payments and in forgiven loans for these
shares. (Transcript at 50; accord Transcript at 135-40, 144.)
18.

Over time, both parties became involved in the management of

StimTrainer, James more than Sandra. (Transcript at 101.) In fact, James was
made president of the company and retired from the military in order to work more
for StimTrainer. (Transcript at 102.)
19.

Sandra testified about various automobiles and other personal

property that were owned by the parties at the time of the marriage and that were
purchased by them during the marriage and the payment of various expenses
related to James and his children and other family members. (Transcript at 65-71,
85-90.) In essence, Sandra testified that she paid for all of these items out of her
personal funds. Additionally, Sandra testified that James provided her with no
economic benefits except for medical insurance but lived with "essentially no
living expenses for himself or his family" for the marriage period, even though she
later acknowledged that he had earned upwards of $180,000 during the marriage
that was used for himself, his children, and his ex-wife's alimony payments.
(Transcript at 107, 111.)
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20.

Sandra further testified to her personal funds being very nearly

depleted during the time that she was married to James. (Transcript at 73-74.)
Testimony of Ben Probst
21.

Sandra presented the testimony of an expert witness, a certified public

accountant Ben Probst, who testified that the large majority of the funds that went
into the Joint Account were from either the Trust Account or Sandra's Personal
Account. (Transcript at 53-58.) Probst acknowledged that James contributed at
least $26,000 ($19,000 from the sale of James premarital home, as well as a $5000
deposit on November 30, 2005 and a $2000 deposit on December 20, 2006).
(Transcript at 56-58; accord Transcript at 125-28.)
22.

Probst testified that all of the funds used to purchase the Wasatch

property were derived from the Trust Account. (Transcript at 58.) Probst testified
that Sandra's Georgia home was purchased and its mortgage was paid off with her
separate funds, as was the case with various other pieces of property. (Transcript
at 58-59.)
Testimony of James Poll
23.

Prior to his marriage with Sandra, James was a single father of four

children on active duty in the military with a normal standard of living. He owned
a fairly large home with a pool and was paying the mortgage on it, owned a car,

1Q

etc. (Transcript at 118.) He had a successful career in the Army. (Transcript at
118-19.)
24.

When James and Sandra met and eventually decided to get married,

they both envisioned a life together raising their children from their prior
marriages. (Transcript at 121.)
25.

Prior to the marriage, a prenuptial agreement was discussed by both

parties at the urging of her parents and James agreed to it. Sandra eventually
dropped the idea because she was advised by her trustee Rob Gray that it was not
necessary, regardless of what her parents thought. (Transcript at 122-23; see also
Transcript at 78 (identifying Rob Gray as Sandra's trustee).)
26.

James testified that the funds placed in the Joint Account were

intended to be marital funds. (Transcript at 128.)
27.

James testified that he had a checking account from prior to the

marriage into which he deposited his earnings and his pension payments.
(Transcript at 148.) He further testified that the funds in this account were used for
family purposes similar to how the funds in the Joint Account were used, including
for gasoline, school supplies, groceries, electronics, clothing (including a suit for
Sandra's son, Michael). (Transcript at 128-131.) Sandra acknowledged at least
some of these payments but denied paying a lot of attention to what was being
done with James checking account. (Transcript at 85.)
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28.

As of the date of trial, James was essentially penniless. (Transcript at

29.

James contributed construction/remodeling work on Sandra's Georgia

131.)

house. (Transcript at 131-32, 178-80.)
30.

James was billed over $22,872.61 by the United States government

for the costs of the parties' move from Georgia to Utah. (Transcript at 133-35.)
31.

In addition to the moneys contributed by Sandra to StimTrainer,

James also invested some of his funds in the company. (Transcript at 140-41.)
James also spent substantial time working for StimTrainer, initially while he was
still with the Army and later after he retired from the military. (Transcript at 14143.) James sole reason for leaving the Army was his intent to work for
StimTrainer. (Transcript at 147-48.)
32.

James testified that he did not request that his name be included on the

title to the Wasatch property; rather, Sandra did that of her own accord in
recognition of the fact that the two were married. (Transcript at 161-62.) James
understood that this meant that the Wasatch property would be marital in nature.
(Transcript at 163.)
33.

James deeded the Wasatch property to Sandra individually about

seven months later because as an officer of StimTrainer he was advised to remove
his name from the Wasatch property. (Transcript at 163-65.) This deeding was
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done solely for asset protection purposes. (Transcript at 165-66.) Sandra was fully
aware of that reason. (Transcript at 166.)
34.

Although the parties intended eventually to make the Wasatch

property their home, they never actually moved to the property. Instead, they
rented the house there to persons that managed the farm in exchange for rent.
(Transcript at 168-71.) Of the two parties, James was the one that worked with the
renters to ensure that the house was being kept up and that the farm was being
properly managed. (Transcript at 171-72.)
35.

James also contributed to protecting the value of the Wasatch property

by helping oppose the efforts of a neighboring landowner to effect a condemnation
of part of the Wasatch property to create an easement and the Wasatch property's
annexation into a new township or city. (Transcript at 172-78.)
Expert Report
36.

Finally, the parties stipulated that, if called, James' expert would

testify to the matters included in his expert report, which was admitted as Exhibit
18. (Transcript at 193-94; R. 324, Exhibit 18.) The bottom line conclusion of that
report is that as of April 8, 2010, one month before trial, the Wasatch property had
a fair market value of $1,650,000. (R. 324, Exhibit 18.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
James asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial court determining
that the Wasatch property was Sandra's personal, separate property not subject to
equitable division. The trial court made two primary factual findings on which it
rested its determination: 1) Sandra never intended to give James an interest in the
Wasatch property, and 2) because James engaged in a "fraudulent conveyance," he
could not ask the court to do equity in his favor by granting him an interest in the
Wasatch property. In these two findings, the trial court erred.
First, the facts that Sandra herself admitted to in her testimony establish that,
contrary to her conclusory assertion that she did not intend to make a gift to James
of a one-half interest in the Wasatch property, she did in fact intend such a gift.
This intent is clearly shown in the evidence and requires this Court to reverse the
trial court's finding to the contrary.
Second, the elements of "fraudulent conveyance" (now known in Utah as
"fraudulent transfer") are not met in this case. Even if they were, there is no basis
for Sandra to be allowed to assert it. Finally, even if the transfer of the Wasatch
property were a fraudulent conveyance and Sandra were allowed to assert it, the
effect of that assertion would be to return the property to its prior status, that is, to
a joint tenancy held by James and Sandra as husband and wife. The case law cited

by the trial court is easily distinguishable and provides no basis in support of the
trial court's conclusions.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
An appellate court will make changes to "a trial court's property division

determination in a divorce action only if there was a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence
clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Olson v. Olson, 2010 UT App 22, \ 7,
226 P.3d 751. The trial court's factual findings on which its determination is based
are reviewed clear error. Id. ^9.
II.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE
REVERSED AND JAMES SHOULD BE AWARDED AN
EQUITABLE SHARE OF THE WASATCH PROPERTY
A.

Sandra Intended the Wasatch Property to Be a Gift to James or
the Marital Estate

The law is clear as to the disposition upon divorce of property obtained by
the parties during the marriage: it is to be distributed between them equitably,
which generally means equally. Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, ^ 15, 190
P.3d 497; Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah App. 1993); Burt v. Burt, 799
P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1990). The law is also clear as to the disposition of
property that was owned by one of the spouses prior to the marriage: such

property is generally considered the "separate property" of the spouse that brought
it to the marriage and it will be returned to that spouse at the time of divorce.
Thompson v. Thompson, 2009 UT App 101 \ 8, 208 P.3d 539; Kunzler, 2008 UT
App 263,1| 15.10
The general rule concerning the disposition of "separate property", however,
can give way under certain circumstances.
Separate property can become part of the marital estate and subject to
equitable distribution if (1) the other spouse has contributed to "the
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property," . . .
(2) "the property has been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling," . . . or (3) the distribution [of the separate property]
achieves a fair, just and equitable result."
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"Separate property" also includes property obtained during the marriage by one
of the spouses by gift or inheritance. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307
(Utah 1988).
1

Concerning the proper procedure for accomplishing this division, this Court has
previously ruled: "After the separate property of each spouse is identified and
backed out of the estate, the marital property is typically awarded so that each
spouse receives a roughly equal share." Thompson, 2009 UT App 101, f 9. In this
case, the trial court followed this procedure by first determining that the Wasatch
property was the separate property of Sandra and awarding it to her. It then
proceeded to effect an equitable distribution of the remainder of the property.
Indeed, inasmuch as the division of the remainder of the property was
accomplished pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, there can be no claim
that it was not equitable. Thus, the only question before this Court is whether the
trial court erred in its determination that the Wasatch property was separate or
marital in nature. If the Court determines that James' argument on this point is
correct, the Court should order that James be awarded an equitable share of the
value of the Wasatch property. The division of the remaining property should have
no effect on this question.

Thompson, 2009 UT App 101,^9 (citations omitted; alterations by the court).
Additionally, separate property becomes marital property "when the acquiring
spouse places title in their joint names in such a manner as to evidence an intent to
make it marital property" or "has made a gift of an interest therein to the other
spouse." Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 307, 308; accord Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT
App 405, f 20, 147 P.3d 464.11 As this Court has previously stated:
A transfer of otherwise separate property to a joint tenancy with the
grantor's spouse is generally presumed to be a gift, see 41
CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 103(a), at 397 (1991) (citing Kramer v.
Kramer, 709 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Mo.Ct.App. 1986)), and, when coupled
with an evident intent to do so, effectively changes the nature of that
property to marital property. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d
304, 307-08 (Utah 1988); see also Bonnell v. Bonnell, 117 Wis. 2d
241, 344 N.W.2d 123, 126 (1984) (stating spouse may transfer
separate property into marital estate and "separate property transferred
into joint tenancy becomes part of the marital estate"); cf. Jesperson v.
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980) (finding trial court did not
abuse discretion in awarding home held in joint tenancy to wife when
"there was no intention by [wife] to create a one-half property interest

Whenever the trial court determines that previously separate property has
become marital property, it must make findings of fact sufficient to justify the
decision. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1170.
In this case, neither party argued that otherwise separate property became
marital property through protection, maintenance, or enhancement of value,
through commingling, or pursuant to the needs of fairness, justice, and equity.
Accordingly, the only issue is whether Sandra made a gift of the Wasatch property
to James or to the marital estate or otherwise titled the property in a manner
indicative of an intent to add that property to the marital estate. Kunzler v.
Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, f 21 (declining to address possible arguments in
support of reversal that neither party adequately raised before the trial court).
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in [husband], nor any expectation by [husband] that he had received a
one-half property interest").
Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, \ 22, 993 P.2d 887.
In this case, James is asking the Court to review and reverse the trial court's
factual finding that Sandra did not make a gift of the Wasatch property to the
marital estate or to James and that the placing of the Wasatch property in both their
names did not evidence an intent to make it marital property. For the reasons
shown below, the trial court's findings were in error and this Court must reverse
them.
Under the marshalling requirement applicable to requests to reverse factual
findings, James has provided in his Statement of Facts above all of the evidence
that could be construed to support the trial court's findings on this matter. This
evidence is reviewed again here in this section together with the contrary evidence.
There are a number of facts that are not in dispute. The undisputed facts
show that, after joint discussion, James and Sandra both signed the REPC
obligating both of them to pay $2.3 million dollars for the purchase of the Wasatch
property. (Transcript at 43, 93-94; R. 324, Exhibit 2.) The entire amount of the
purchase price was derived from Sandra's separate, premarital property, i.e., the
Trust Account. (Transcript at 43, 93.) The parties both intended to live there
together as husband and wife and to raise their children there. (Transcript at 47,

96, 158.) The Wasatch Property was deeded to the parties in both their names, as
husband and wife.12 (Transcript at 43-44, 94-95; R. 324, Exhibit 3.)
The fact that the Wasatch property was deeded to both parties as joint
tenants, under Bradford, raises the presumption that it was a gift. Thus, if the
evidence showed at trial that Sandra had "an intent to do so," the formerly separate
property would have become marital property.
Sandra argues that there was no such intent. Indeed, she explicitly testified
to that effect.
Q Okay. Now, why was Mr. Poll's name included on those
documents [i.e., the REPC and warranty deed]?
A We were married, and quite frankly, I hadn't - 1 didn't think about
it at the time.
Q Okay. Did you intend at that time to make him [James] a gift of
$1,150,000?
A No. Absolutely not
(Transcript at 44.) This testimony, which was given approximately four years after
the fact and after a dispute had arisen between the parties and her motivations
would have changed, is the only direct evidence supporting the trial court's
12

In Utah, when "real estate [is] granted to two persons in their own right who are
designated as husband and wife in the granting documents, unless severed,
converted, or expressly declared in the grant to be otherwise." the presumption is
that they take the property as joint tenants. Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-5(l)(a). There
was no evidence presented to the trial court to contradict this presumption.
Accordingly, James and Sandra held the Wasatch property as joint tenants.
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determination that she did not intend to make a gift of the Wasatch property. For
the reasons shown below, however, this conclusory assertion is too thin a reed on
which to rest Sandra's argument and the trial court's finding.
It can be expected that Sandra will argue that other evidence supports the
trial court's finding. Proper analysis, however, establishes that any such evidence
fails to do so. For instance, Sandra testified that shortly after they signed, she
became concerned of a situation in which the property's nature would be at issue.
(Transcript at 44-45.) Similarly, she testified that she did not ask James to deed the
property back to her because she wanted to avoid an argument. (Transcript at 47.)
Whatever Sandra may have felt or thought after the documents were signed does
not provide evidence of what her intent was at the time of the signing which, under
Mortensen, is the crucial issue. Mortens en, 760 P.2d at 307 (separate property
becomes marital property "when the acquiring spouse places title in their joint
names in such a manner as to evidence and intent to make it marital property."
(emphasis added)).
The trial court found that it was undisputed "that the parties made a
considerable effort throughout the course of their marriage to keep their assets
separate [and] there was continued separation of accounts." Findings ^ 24. Sandra
can be expected to argue that this finding also supports the trial court's finding that
there was no intent to make the Wasatch property part of the marital estate. A

proper analysis, however, leads to precisely the opposite conclusion. Specifically,
when the parties have a track record of keeping assets separate and have shown the
ability to do so, the fact that on one particular occasion they acted in a contrary
manner evidences that they intended a different result than their usual course of
action. That is what happened here.
In this case, the testimony was clear that James was not added to Sandra's
Personal Account or to the Trust Account. (Transcript at 80-81.) Nor was he
given her power of attorney. (Transcript at 78.) The reason for that is also clear:
these accounts were not to be considered his property in any way. (Transcript at
80-81; accord Transcript 162-63.) In contrast, the Joint Account was opened by
them both and treated as marital property with both of their names included on it.
(Transcript at 84.) Accordingly, the fact that the parties kept their property
separate in most instances does not support, but rather undermines, the trial court's
finding that there was no intent to make the Wasatch property part of the marital
estate because it was not kept separate by the parties.
Accordingly, beyond Sandra's conclusory testimony, there is no evidence
that she did not intend to make a gift of the Wasatch property. Under the
marshaling requirement, however, to obtain a reversal, James must demonstrate to
this Court the "fatal flaw" in the trial court's findings. W. Valley City v. Majestic

Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991). In this case, there is such a fatal
flaw.
Specifically, Sandra testified that she was worried about having the Wasatch
property in both parties' names. (Transcript at 44.) This worry was based on her
parents and her trustee telling her that the property needed to be in her name only.
This advice gave her cause to fear "just a situation as this, that - and my parents
had told me that this could happen as well as my trustee." (Transcript at 44-45.)
On cross-examination, Sandra clarified that she had been given this advice before
she signed the documents. In other words, she was made aware of the fact that
putting the property in both names would expose it to a claim that it was marital
property, subject to division in case of a divorce. Despite having received this
advice, she proceeded to sign the documents that placed the property in a joint
tenancy. This is evidence so strong that it cannot properly be ignored or
contradicted. This is the fatal flaw, the point where the trial court made its crucial
error in its findings. The clear weight of the evidence, that is, evidence presented
by Sandra herself, establishes that the trial court erred in finding that she did not
intend to make the Wasatch property part of the marital estate.13

This conclusion is supported by the fact that Sandra's earlier testimony on direct
examination that she did not think about why James' name was to be put on the
deed (Transcript at 44) is inherently not credible in light of her later testimony that
she was given specific advice before the transaction about the advisability of
having his name on the property (Transcript at 95-96).

Accordingly, the trial court was presented with a situation where the
Bradford presumption governed. There was property granted to a husband and
wife in joint tenancy and there was evidence of Sandra's intent to make the
property marital in nature. That results in the property becoming marital property,
properly subject to division by the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court's
determination that the Wasatch property was not marital property was clearly
erroneous.
B.

James Did Not Fraudulently Transfer the Wasatch Property So
As to Forfeit His Beneficial Interest Therein

In what was effectively an alternative holding, the trial court further found
that, even if the Wasatch property had become marital property, it lost that status
when, in March 2007, James deeded it to Sandra in her own name only. In
particular, the trial court held that the transfer of the Wasatch property was the
equivalent of a fraudulent conveyance which was inequitable conduct by James
and that thus precluded him from sharing in the value of the property. Again, the
trial court clearly erred in this finding.

It is further supported by the fact that after the parties signed the REPC, if Sandra
had changed her mind and had not been willing to fund the purchase, James would
have been liable, jointly and severally, for the entire unpaid balance owing on the
$2.3 million obligation.
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1. The Title Name Is Not Controlling in Determining to Whom
Marital Property Should Be Awarded
Since, as shown above, the Wasatch property was made marital property by
Sandra's agreeing to have it deeded to both parties as joint tenants and her intent
that it be so conveyed, the next question is what effect the subsequent transfer from
joint tenancy to Sandra individually had on the property's character. First, it is
basic Utah law that the distribution of marital property does not depend on whose
name the property is titled in. "Plaintiffs attempt to classify all properties acquired
during the marriage as his separate property is of no avail. The fact that title was
not in their joint names and that the properties were purchased with funds
generated from his other rental properties is not determinative of the distribution to
be made." Huckv. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1986). Rather, as noted above,
marital property is to be distributed equitably (which generally means equal shares)
between the two parties, Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263 f 15; Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022;
Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172, and this is regardless of the names on the titles to the
individual pieces of property. Accordingly, the simple fact that the parties chose to
re-title the Wasatch property, standing alone, does not change the fact that James is
entitled to an equitable share therein.14

Indeed, even in the commercial context, the deeding of a title to another does not
necessarily indicate an intent to convey a particular interest and parol evidence
may be required to determine such intent. "We think these cases are applicable,
however, to illustrate that the mere transfer of a warranty deed does not
TQ

It makes sense that, just as separate property can be given to the marital
estate, marital property can be given to the separate estate of either party. The
same requirement that re-titling of the property be accompanied by an intent by the
grantor to alienate the property from the estate in which he or she has an interest
should apply equally. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ^j 22 (holding that the nature
of the property changes only "when coupled with an evident intent to do so").
In this case, Sandra conceded that the sole intent that James had in deeding
the Wasatch property into her name only was to protect it from creditors, not to
effect a change of his interest in the property as it might relate to Sandra:
Q Did he [James] give you reasons for having signed that document
[i.e., the deed transferring the Wasatch property to Sandra's
name]?
A Yes, he did.
Q What was your response to whatever reasons he gave you?
A I didn't particularly care what the reason was. I was grateful and
relieved to have the document to - to have the deed back in my
name.
Q Okay. The - did he give you an explanation of why, or did anyone
give you an explanation of why they were transferring it to you?
A Yes.
Q Andautomatically establish that the parties intend a conveyance." Winegar v. Froerer
Corp,, 813 P.2d 104, 111 (Utah 1991).
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A It was felt that it would be a good idea, that with regard to
StimTrainer it could be under dispute if there were any difficulties
with StimTrainer because he was an officer of the company and
the company had some difficulties with creditors.
(Transcript at 46-47.) Additionally, she testified:
Q Okay. Do you recall that about this same time there was another
shareholder [of StimTrainer] that was somewhat disgruntled with
the company and how it was proceeding?
A Yes.
Q And do you recall that advice was given to Mr. Poll that the
company could not afford liability insurance for him and so he
should take steps to protect his assets?
A I don't particularly remember it that way, but I think that was the
general idea. Yes.
Q And you acknowledge that when James Poll signed Exhibit 4 to
transfer the title out of his name into your name alone, that was his
purpose in doing so?
A That was his purpose in doing so, yes. And I was grateful he did
so.
(Transcript at 99-100.)15
Based on the foregoing evidence, the only conclusion that can be drawn is
that James intended to transfer only legal title from the marital estate to Sandra.
There is no evidence of any kind in the record to indicate that James intended to
give up his equitable interest in the Wasatch property. Accordingly, James
James provided testimony to the same effect. (Transcript at 163-166.)
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retained his equitable interest in the Wasatch property and the trial court erred in
not granting him a share of its value as part of the property division in this case.
Indeed, the trial court did not hold to the contrary.
2. There Was No Fraudulent Transfer
The trial court's stated reason for its alternative holding which denied James
an interest in the Wasatch property after having deeded it over to Sandra was the
fact that such transfer had the appearance of a fraudulent conveyance.16 In this
analysis, the trial court erred.
Under Utah law, the elements of the various types of fraudulent transfer are
spelled out in the in Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-5 and -6 (the full terms of these
statutory provisions are included in the Addenda). Under each of these sections, it
is clear that there can be no fraudulent transfer unless there is a "creditor".
Sections 5 and 6 each provide that a "transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as
to a creditor . . . if . . . ." (Emphasis added.) A "creditor" is defined as a person
that has a "claim." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(4). A "claim," in turn, is defined as
"a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to a judgment, liquidated,

16

Utah's Fraudulent Conveyances statute (Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-1-1 to -16) was
repealed in 1988 and replaced with the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 to -14 (the "Act"). Accordingly, the use by the trial court
and Sandra's counsel of the term "fraudulent conveyance" was anachronistic. This
brief assumes that reference to "fraudulent transfer" was what was intended by the
trial court in making its findings.
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unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(3).
In this case, there was evidence presented at trial that StimTrainer and its
officers and advisors were concerned that there might be the assertion of a "claim"
by a particular shareholder. There was no evidence that any claim was actually
ever asserted. Nor was there evidence that even if there had been an assertion of
such a claim that the claim would have been sustained. Certainly there was no
evidence that StimTrainer's officers and advisers were willing to concede liability
to the disgruntled shareholder. All of this establishes that there was no actual
"claim" in this case and without a claim there could be no "creditor." Accordingly,
there was no fraudulent transfer made by James in this case. This conclusion is
further strengthened by the fact that the transfer was made on the advice James and
Sandra received from StimTrainer's leadership team. (Transcript at 99-100, 16466.)
Additionally, the evidence was clear that James and Sandra jointly
participated in this transfer. Compare R. 324, Exhibit 4 (showing both Sandra's
and James' signatures on the deed) with Transcript at 44-45, 99-100 (showing that
Sandra knew full well the purpose behind the transfer and that she did not care
about the reasons). Essentially, this means that, if the deed did represent a
fraudulent transfer, Sandra was equally willing to defraud James' creditors out of
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this asset. Sandra's inequitable conduct, however, was more extensive that James
because she was willing to defraud James as well. She knew full well that the
purpose of the transfer was solely to protect the property from third-party creditors,
not to effect a change in the beneficial interest that each of the parties had in it.
Moreover, if the transfer of the Wasatch property to Sandra alone were in
fact a fraudulent transfer, the statute is clear as to what the remedy is: the transfer
may be avoided to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim. Utah Code
Ann. § 25-6-8 (the full statutory provision is included in the Addenda). In this
case, there is no creditor; there is no claim; there is no need for a remedy. But if
the Court were to effect such a remedy, it would simply avoid the transfer and act
as though the transfer never occurred. In other words, the Wasatch property would
be treated as if it remained in both James' and Sandra's names.
The trial court relied on the case of Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App 241, 95
P.3d 1221, as a justification for its decision. That case is distinguishable from the
instant matter. In Hone, two brothers, Alton and Lloyd Hone, had an elderly
mother, Alta Hone, who needed institutional care. Alta, Alton, and Lloyd were all
trustees of a trust of which Alta was the beneficiary. The two brothers wanted to
obtain Medicaid payments for that care but Alta was ineligible as long as her
family homestead was located in the trust. After discussions with Medicaid
officials, the Hones learned that, because Lloyd had lived in the home for a
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sufficient time and because he too was disabled, if the trust transferred the entire
interest in the homestead to him, Alta would qualify for Medicaid benefits.
Accordingly, the trust executed the documents necessary to effect the transfer, thus
allowing Alta to receive the government benefits. In doing so, Lloyd orally
promised Alton that he would transfer the home back to the trust upon Alta's
death. After Alta dies, Lloyd refused to transfer the house back to the trust. Alton
then brought suit against Lloyd on behalf of the trust to recover the residence.
The trial court refused Alton's request and this Court affirmed that decision.
The reasoning was that, if Lloyd's promise to return the home to the trust was
enforceable, then the Hones had all participated in a scheme to illegally obtain
government benefits because Alta would qualify for Medicaid benefits only if the
trust's entire interest were transferred.
Thus, insofar as Lloyd Hone's verbal promise to reconvey the
property upon Alta's death is enforceable, the original transfer did not
transfer all property rights to Lloyd Hone, but rather resulted in Lloyd
Hone holding the property in trust for the Trust.
This creates a dilemma for Alton Hone. On the one hand, there
are no legal grounds to reform the deed and place ownership of the
Homestead back in the Trust unless Lloyd Hone's promise is legally
enforceable on equitable grounds. On the other hand, insofar as Lloyd
Hone's promise to reconvey is legally enforceable, the original
transfer, which Alton approved, was a sham designed to deceive
Medicaid. As the trial court recognized, Alton cannot maintain both
(1) that he did nothing wrong when he represented to Medicaid as a
trustee of the Trust that the Homestead had been transferred to an
eligible transferee, Lloyd Hone; and (2) that Lloyd Hone always was
legally obligated to transfer the property back to the Trust upon Alta
^o

Hone's death. Because Alton maintains that Lloyd Hone's promise is
enforceable, he deceived Medicaid when the property was originally
transferred.
Hone, 2004 UT App 241,ffif8-9
In this case, James never deceived anybody. There never was a fraudulent
transfer. There never was a victim. James never mistreated or maltreated
anybody. At most, what James did is what is commonly referred to as "asset
protection." Simply putting one's assets in a position where they are less likely to
be subject to collection is not fraudulent; it is prudent. An entire branch of the
legal profession is dedicated to this area of practice. And every step taken in
furtherance of asset protection is designed to make collection against the assets
more difficult by potential creditors. Only when there is an actual creditor with an
actual claim (and when the other requirements of the statute are present) does such
transferring become fraudulent. In this case, there was no creditor and no claim.
Without those, James' action could not be fraudulent. Nor can Sandra complain of
those actions: she was a willing participant in them. The actions taken by James
were designed to protect her as well as him.
Unlike Alton Hone's argument to the court, there is nothing inconsistent
with James' position. James' position is that he transferred only legal title to the
Wasatch property to Sandra but retained a beneficial interest therein. That position
does not put him in violation of the Act. If the transfer could be rescinded under
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be somewhat questionable in light of the Act, if this argument is recognized as a
basis for denying the distribution of marital i ^ y - s r i } r one spouse or another, r
will open the door to unscrupulous practices between divorcing spouses.

In

particular, one spouse will be able to defraud the othvi by encouraging the

potential). The first spouse could then file for divorce and claim the other spouse
(1) gave up any interest in the marital property by approving the titling in oi le
name only and (2) is precluded from arguing to the contrary because of some
"fu- argument applies equally whether it is applied to the situation where the
unscrupulous spouse has a present intent to divorce or is simply taking steps to
protect his or her own interests in case a divorce happens later on.
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inchoate intent to defraud some potential creditor that the parties were concerned
about. The Court should not adopt a rule that would foster fraud and distrust
between spouses.
C.

There Are No Other Equitable Arguments That Justify a Total
Denial to James of Any Share in the Wasatch Property

Although the trial court did not expressly include in its oral ruling any other
basis for its findings and conclusions that James should not share in the Wasatch
property, it did include as a written finding, the following:
The court finds based upon the facts as the court has found,
combined with the overall history of the respective party's marital
contributions, including the substantial losses incurred, and then by
weighing the equities, the court finds it would not be unjust for Mrs.
Poll to retain the Wasatch County property and water right as her
separate property.
(R. at 334-35 (f 35)). In other words, the trial court found two additional bases
that justified characterizing the Wasatch property as Sandra's separate property:
(1) the overall history of the parties' marital contributions, and (2) the substantial
losses suffered.
1 O

The record does not justify these determinations. First, the overall history
shows that both parties contributed financially to the marriage. The trial court
James assumes that the trial court did not intend to make these findings based on
Sandra's status as a widow, let alone a 9/11 widow. Such would be arbitrary and
capricious. Whether the trial court reached the correct conclusion in this matter or
whether James' position is correct, it should be equally applicable in a similar case
where the divorcing party was a non-9/11 widow, had received substantial funds
42

found that James ""! IM id essei itiall> i J • II • i i lg e x:pei ises' ' ' < ii u ii ig tl le 1 ii m :; < )f 1 1 :n

oi c i i; i K >rtgage, ii is clearly accurate. Sandra clearly did provide that economic
contribution to the marriage.
To the extent that the trial court meant that James had no expenses at all and
did not pay for family expenses, however, it was clearly erroneous. " b irsl, Sandra
acknowledged that during the marriage James carnal nitm llian $ I MO,(Hill (ml ll I
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home ('Tninseripl ill I I I I

: siifled ihat, except for the S10,000 down

payment on the pickup truck, he paid for the entire vehicle out of the funds he was
earning. (Transcript at 86-8",

:

; Similarly, James testified without

contradiction that he paid out of the funds he was earning "gasoline, clothing,
electronics, sc

;;nngs, groceries, clothing," including a su

^, .. •<

nl A«. I'MIIIII 'Vere used extensively for family purposes." (Transcript, at
derived from a prior divorce, or was simply independently wealthy. The source o\
the separate property brought to the marriage is irrelevant when that property has
been given to the other party or to the marital estate.
Such a conclusion would be impossible to square with the trial court"^ * •* .ii
finding: "I do not conclude that the parties dhJ u j hake considerable separate
contributions to the marriage, and they have been articulated lo some degree in
terms of contributions to marital expenses, repair of the Georgia home ano \s ha*
not." H ran script at °0^ )
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130.) Although given the opportunity to refute the idea that James paid for
substantial expenses out of his account, Sandra denied knowing what was done
with his account. (Transcript at 85.) Additionally, James was the party billed for
the costs of the family's move from Georgia to Utah. (Transcript at 133-34; R.
324, Exhibit 16.)
More importantly, which of the two parties paid the bills during the marriage
is not a relevant consideration in determining whether Sandra had the intent, at the
time, to contribute the Wasatch property to the marital estate. This is the
controlling question; not who paid for the groceries.
The "losses" referred to in paragraph 35 of the Findings appear to refer to
the loss that was suffered when Sandra sold her Georgia home for approximately
$150,000 less than she purchased it for (R. 341 (Findings % 12); Transcript at 107)
and possibly to the loss of funds invested in StimTrainer. Neither of these losses
justifies a denial of James' marital interest in the Wasatch property. First, the
Georgia home was Sandra's separate property. As such, she is the only one that
stood to gain substantially if the market had risen while she held it. Because James
would have had no claim to any such appreciation if it had occurred, he should not
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In the case of the StimTrainer stock, there was no evidence of loss presented
at trial, certain!) nothing quantifiable. ' Ihere was no evidence presented at trial as
to w hat the value of the StimTrainer shares were at any time other than when they
were purchased
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Next, there was evidence that, as of the dale 1 .»=
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$520,000 left of the millions that Sandra had at the beginning of the marn ^ e .
Specifically, she testified that there was only $130,000 left in the Trust Account.
(Transcript at 72.) In addition, she recognized the $390,000 that was the proceeds
from., the sale of her Georgia home. (Transcript at 7.2 ) I( 01 tl iree reasons,, tl: lis
testin 101 i..y, 1: IOV • e < ei Is 1: 1 ::) t a propel basis :fo a coi icli isic 1: 1 tl: 1a t thei e wei e

• '

substantial losses that should preclude James froi 1: 1 participating ii 1 the \ ah le of tl: :ie
Wasatch property. First, this testimony completely ignores the value of the
Wasatch property. T h e unrebutted evidence at trial was that the Wasatch... property
The result might be different if i h u v were evicience that James had c a u ^ d li-i
loss in value that Sandra sustained on her (icorgia home Rut there w as u< -JK
evidence at all presented 10 ti-„« ir".,1 ,,,.. ; Indeed, the c\ idencc was lo t h
contrary, that James, Ihrwigh his work, improved Sandra's (ieorgia honk
(Transcript at 178-80.)

AS

at that time had a value of $1.65 million. Second, there was no testimony as to
what caused the "losses" of Sandra's millions. It could have been poor investing
decisions on her part, joint spending by James and Sandra, or even spending by her
alone. To the extent that the money was gone because of spending decisions,
whether by James or Sandra, it cannot really be termed "losses." Third, to the
extent that the "losses" were caused by bad investments (which is entirely
plausible given that these losses occurred during the same time as the severe
recession and bear market that this country has recently experienced), that can
hardly be blamed on James and he should not be held responsible for that.
Finally, the trial court completely ignored the equities that weighed in favor
of James. First, when he came to the marriage, he owned a nice residence with
significant equity. (Transcript at 118-19.) He had a successful military career but
he retired from it to take a position at the company he expected would be funded
by Sandra. (Transcript at 146-48.) He was taking care of his children and meeting
the obligations of everyday life. When the marriage dissolved, James was
essentially destitute. (Transcript at 131.) He no longer owned a home but had to
reside with his parents. (Transcript at 168.) He no longer had his military career.
(Transcript at 147-48.)
By any measure, Sandra retains well over $2 million in value (including the
Wasatch property) as of the date of trial. Depending on the exact amount that she
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which has not been valued. In terms of losses, the equities

certainly weigh in favor of James, not Sandra.
CONCLUSION
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io Ihc inal court lor cnuy of an order awarding James

one-half the value of the Wasatch property, as proven at trial.

DATED this 3 d day of January, 2011
"

F II I MOR E SPEN CER , I I C

Matthew R. Howell
3301 N. University Avenue
Provo,Utah 84604
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, this 3d day of January,
2011, to the following:
Brent Young
Ivie & Young
226 West 2230 North #210
Provo, Utah 84603
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P) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced U~
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, d^puied,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5
25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer - Claim arising before or after transfer,
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether
the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if
the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation;
and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining
assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur,
debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may be given, among
other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or
threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the
value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the
assets to an insider of the debtor.

2S-0-0. Fraudulent transtc* * iaim aiiMu^ in-tori transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent a^ to a creditor whose
claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation wa-, inc.inwl if:
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation; and
\ h) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a result of the transfer or
i 13 A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the
transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was
insolvent at the time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was
insolvent.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-8
25-6-8. Remedies of creditors.
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject
to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's
claim;
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property
of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil
procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset
transferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the
transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the
court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.

57-1-5. Creation of joint tenancy presumed — Tenancy in common —
Severance of joint tenanc) - . enants by the entirety — Tenants holding as
community property.
(1) (a) Beginning on Ma\ : - 1W7, e\er\ ownership interest in real estate
granted to two persons in their *u n ugm uho are designated as husband and wife
in the granting documents is pr:sumed to be a joint tenancy interest with rights of
survivorship, unless severed, converted, or expressly declared in the grant to be
otherwise.

Supplemental Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law

RLED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
—

~i«_ueputy

B R E N T I). V O l I N C ^5M)
IVIE& YOUNG
Attorneys for Petitioner
226 West 2230 North
P.O. Box 657
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: (801) 375-3000
Fax:(801)375-3067
IN THE FOl'RTII DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR \ I \ 11 I "< H M \ ^ TATE OF UTAH
SANDRA POLL, nka SANDRA SI KAUB,
Petit

si PPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
^ND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

.. ,
Civil No. 094400044
Commissioner: Tom Patton
Judge: Fred Howard

v.
JAMES COOK POLL,
Respondent.

I he above ei rtitled n lattei can le oi i befoi e tl le coi u: t fc i ti iai, the I lonorable I h ed D.
Howard presiding. Petitioner, Sandra Poll, now known as Sandra Straub, was present,
•pi "* ' -

: r% l

.-.:iij.. Ki:s[»;iui, i>,. .Uiiiic c t,uk ; .., was present and represented by

Matthew R. Howell. Witnesses were sworn and testified. The court entertained argument of
COUTV

, i .i\ni thereafter entered its ruling on the record and accepted a partial stipulation The

com t now makes and enters the

following:
FINDINGS OF F A C T

1-

P< stitionei Sandi : i Si t ai il > fib i Sandr; 11 \ >11, anc I Resp< )i ident, Jai i les Cc K ik I "oil,

were married on April 8, 2005.

2.

The court finds there are no children of this relationship, and none are expected.

3.

The court finds Petitioner's former husband died in Building Number 2 of the

World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010,
page 5 line 3, page 34 line 2).
4.

The court finds Petitioner received one million dollars from the American Bar

Endowment. (Transcript dated May 12, 1010 page 34 line 16).
5.

. The court finds Petitioner received about 3.8 million dollars from the 9/11

Victim's Compensation Fund. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 35, line 16).
6.

The court finds Petitioner also received money from a life insurance company, in

an amount which she did not specifically recall, as well as stock disbursements from a 401k.
(Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 35, lines 19-22).
7.

The court finds Petitioner placed the money in trust into a trust account in her

name. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 36, line 1, Petitioner's Exhibit 1).
8.

The court finds Petitioner also received money from the sale of a home in Boston,

Massachusetts, which money was put into the trust account. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010
page 106, line 15).
9.

The court finds Petitioner purchased a home in Georgia, in her name. She made

six monthly payments in the amount of $2,596.39. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9). She retired the
mortgage on the Georgia home in the amount of $462,948.80. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9). It was
stipulated these funds were the Petitioner's separate premarital funds which came from the trust.
10.

The court finds the parties lived in the Georgia home. Mr. Poll and his four

2

children, and Mrs. Poll and her two children, all resided in the home. Mr. Poll and his children
resided in the home from March 15 or 16th' (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 123 line 24),
the time the home was purchased and Mrs. Poll, and her children moved to the Georgia home
approximately two months later. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 124 line 1). They resided
in the Georgia home until the parties moved to Utah on about the July 3, 2008. (Transcript dated
May 12, 2010 page 131, line 13).
11.

The court finds Respondent had essentially no living expenses for approximately

3 1/2 years. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 107 line 18). In this regard the court finds
Mrs. Poll's testimony credible.
12.

The court finds the Georgia home was sold at a loss of approximately $ 150,000.

The proceeds from the sale of the Georgia home were, during these proceedings, held at a local
bank. The proceeds were approximately $390,000. Mr. Poll stipulated that Mrs. Poll, nka
Straub, could be awarded the proceeds from the sale of the Georgia home. (Transcript dated
May 12, 2010 page 8 lines 4-17, page 124 line 25).
13.

The court finds Petitioner invested money in a business called StimTrainer. The

initial investment was approximately $150,000. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 137, line
23), and eventually the total investment was approximately $350,000, (Transcript dated May 12,
2010 page 137, line 25) or $400,000. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010, page 144, lines 7-9). The
Respondent invested time and energy (Transcript dated May 12, page 146). It was stipulated
during the second day of trial that the Petitioner's shares of StimTrainer would be endorsed to
Mr. Poll, and certain items of other personal property and cash in the amount of $13,950 would
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be delivered to Mr. Poll in satisfaction of his claims with respect to personal property, the
parties' vehicles, claims for moving expenses from Georgia to Utah, as well as the Petitioner's
rights as a shareholder in StimTrainer. The specific stipulation is set forth beginning on page 5,
line 9, of the Transcript dated 13 May, 2010, and summarized hereafter:
a.

Mr. Poll is awarded the Toyota Tundra pick-up truck.

b.
Mr. Poll is awarded any and all interest that Ms. Poll may have in StimTrainer
Corporation, and Ms. Poll will endorse her stock certificates to Mr. Poll.
c.

Mr. Poll is entitled to have a third party pick up Mr. Poll's children's bedroom
Mr. Poll is not to go to Ms. Poll's home.

d.

Ms. Poll will pay Mr. Poll the sum of $13,950 within 14 days of the date of the

e.

Mr. Poll will hold Ms. Poll harmless for any of the moving costs from the move
from Georgia to Utah.

f.

A Mutual Restraining Order will enter between the parties and neither party will
harm, molest, harass, or otherwise interfering with the lives of the other.

g.

Mr. Poll is entitled to the following pre-marital property: Two racquetball rackets;
one gas weed-eating trimmer; and one six-foot step ladder.

h.

Mr. Poll is awarded the Georgia trailer.

i.

Ms. Poll retains the Toyota Avalon, and retains all right, title and interest in the
Avalon.

j.

Mr. Poll is awarded any other property, not specifically referenced in the

sets.

trial.

agreement, which is currently in his possession.
k.

A portion of the transcript is set forth hereafter regarding the Wasatch County

property.
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THE COURT: He concedes that she retains all right, title, and interest
to the Wasatch property.
MR. YOUNG: Right.
THE COURT: Excepting the right of appeal.
MR. HOWELL: Well, and the - yes. That is correct.
THE COURT: He is conceding his nominal interest here.
MR. HOWELL: Y e s .
THE COURT: - - to her. But he is retaining his right of appeal on the
legal question.

MR. HOWELL: Yes. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 6 lines 15-25, page 7, line
1).
THE COURT: Excepting you are reserving your right of appeal on the
Wasatch property?
MR. YOUNG: Right.
MR. HOWELL: That is correct.
THE COURT: Okay. Is that - - any other corrections?
MR. YOUNG: I can't think of any.

MR. HOWELL: No, Your Honor. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 8, lines 1118).
1.

Each party will pay their own attorney's fees.

m.

Each party is responsible for any debts incurred since the time of separation.

14.

The driving issue in this case is How is the Wasatch County property, purchased

with $2,303,394.90 of Mrs. Poll's separate funds, to be divided? The court must first determine
if this property is marital property or separate property. On remand the Hodge court stated the
rule that the trial court has the obligation to first determine if property is marital or separate,
divide the marital property, and return the separate property, unless there is a reason for division
of the separate property. Hodge v. Hodge, 2007 UT App 394 \5, 174 P.3d 1137; Conundrum
Revisited, David S. Dolowitz, Utah Bar Journal, Volume 23, No. 3, May/June 2010.
15.

For the reasons more specifically set forth hereafter the court finds the property to

be separate, and is to be awarded to Sandra Poll.

16.

The court finds the $2,253,394.99, and the down payment of $50,000, with

respect to the Wasatch County property, came exclusively from the Petitioner's trust, (Transcript
dated May 12, 2010 page 58 line 17, Transcript dated 18 May page 5 line 2). This purchase of
thirty-seven (37) acres, and a water right comprised of 52 shares in Daniel Irrigation Company,
was purchased in Wasatch County on or about July 20, 2006.
17.

The court finds the real estate purchase contract initiated on May 18, 2006

designated the buyer as James C. and Sandra Poll. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2)
18.

The court finds the Warranty Deed from the grantor, Ross Ewing Bethers and

Juanita K. Bethers, to the grantee, James C. Poll and Sandra Poll as husband and wife, was
signed on the 20th day of July 2006. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3)
19.

The court finds the Warranty Deed was signed by James C. Poll and Sandra Poll

on the 16th day of March 2007 with James C. Poll and Sandra Poll as grantors, conveying the
Wasatch County property to Sandra Poll. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4)
20.

The court finds there is no dispute with respect to the source of the money for the

purchase of the Wasatch County property. That source was Petitioner's, Sandra Poll's, trust.
(Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 58 line 23)
21.

The court finds Mr. Poll asserted the theory that a one-half interest in this

property had been a gift to him. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 190, line 11). On direct
examination, he claimed that the property was a gift. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 163
line 19).
22.

The court finds Mr. Poll claimed the reason the parties signed the Warranty Deed

on the 16 day of March 2007 was out of concern that potential creditors may be able to reach
him personally, acting as the President of StimTrainer. He testified "That was the sole reason for
me" for the transfer of the property to Mrs. Poll. (Transcript dated 12 May 2010, page 166 line
3, and Transcript dated 18 May 2010 page 5 lines 7-16).
23.

The court finds Mrs. Poll, the Petitioner, testified that she never intended to make

a gift of the Wasatch County property to Mr. Poll. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 44 lines
13-14) and that shortly after the documents were signed she became "terribly concerned."
(Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 44, line 19, Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 5 line 17).
24.

The court finds that it is undisputed (Transcript dated 12 May 2010 page 201) that

the parties made a considerable effort throughout the course of their marriage to keep their assets
separate. The court finds they did join in terms of actual operating expenses such as groceries
and household goods, but there was a continued separation of their accounts. (Transcript dated
May 18, 2010 page 5 lines 17-23).
25.

The court finds the evidence is unpersuasive that Petitioner, Mrs. Poll, intended to

make a gift of any portion of the Wasatch County property and the accompanying water right
property to Mr. Poll. It is undisputed that Mrs. Poll paid the entire purchase price of
approximately $2,300,000.
26.

The court finds what is more specific and clear about the testimony from Mr. Poll

that it was his intent to convey this property from his estate for purposes of sheltering it from
creditors, with the specific intent of removing it from his estate getting it out of his estate, and
restoring it to hers. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010, page 202 line 24 through page 203 line 5).

27.

Therefore, the court finds the stronger evidence is that of an intention to keep the

property separate. In this regard the court finds the evidence of Sandy Poll to be credible, and
the evidence offered by Mr. Poll to be not credible.
28.

The court finds there was little or no credible testimony from the defendant

regarding the transfer that the parties agreed the title, though transferred to Petitioner, would still
remain joint marital property in terms of specific reference during the discussions. (Transcript
dated May 18, 2010 page 5 lines 19-24).
29.

The court finds it would not be unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Poll's objective

would constitute a potentially fraudulent conveyance. (Transcript dated May 18, 2010 page 6
line 5). The title transfer reflects his intention that his estate not include the Wasatch County
property and that it would be the separate property of Mrs. Poll. However, now he seeks before
a court of equity to claim a one-half interest in that properly.
30.

The court is aware of the case of Hone v. Hone, 95 P.3d 1221 (Utah App. 2004).

In the Hone case, two brothers, Alton Hone and Lloyd Hone, desired for their mother to receive
Medicaid benefits when she became ill. They sought a way for their mother to receive Medicaid
benefits without subjecting their mother's homestead to a Medicaid lien. Lloyd Hone reported to
his brother Alton Hone that the Medicaid lien could be avoided if the homestead were transferred
to Lloyd, because Lloyd had been living in the house and taking care of their mother. Lloyd
Hone promised his brother that if the homestead were transferred to him, he, Lloyd, would
transfer the home back to the trust after their mother died. Presumably, Alton would then
participate in the trust.

31.

After their mother died, Lloyd refused to transfer the homestead back to the trust.

Alton sued Lloyd, seeking to have the property transferred to the trust. The trial court refused to
reform the deed to place the ownership back in the trust. The court ruled that Lloyd's promise to
transfer the property was unenforceable. Interestingly, the court concluded that Alton, as trustee,
had deceived Medicaid about the true nature of the transfer from the trust to Lloyd, and thus had
unclean hands. (Transcript dated May 18, 2010 pages 6 and 7).
32.

The Court of Appeals affirmed and concluded for the reason that "Because Alton

Hone deceived Medicaid under the only legal theory by which Alton Hone is entitled to
equitable relief, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the doctrine of unclean
hands applied to Alton Hone." (at page 1224).
33.

The court finds a similar principle applies here. Mr. Poll claims to have

transferred the property for an improper purpose. Specifically, ".. .by his own testimony [Mr.
Poll] has explained the intention of the parties by agreement to convey this property from his
estate for purposes of sheltering it from creditors with the specific intent of getting it out of his
estate and putting it into hers." (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 203 lines 1-5).
34.

Now Mr. Poll asks a court of equity to reform the very deed, which in his view,

and if not in his view the court's view, had as its objective an improper purpose. He cannot be
heard to complain even if there had been no actual fraudulent conveyance. (Transcript dated
May 18, 2010 page 10 lines 3-5).
35.

The court finds based upon the facts as the court has found, combined with the

overall history of the respective party's marital contributions, including the substantial losses

incurred, and then by weighing the equities, the court finds it would not be unjust for Mrs. Poll to
retain the Wasatch County property and water right as her separate property.
36.

The court finds Petitioner shall be awarded the Toyota Avalon and Chevrolet

Suburban.
37.

The court finds Petitioner shall be awarded the three (3) St. Thomas Marriott

International timeshares and hold Mr. Poll harmless from any financial obligation.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(1)

The court concludes the parties' partial stipulation is reasonable and acceptable.

(2)

The court concludes that it is equitable concerning all of the circumstances

surrounding the acquisition of the Wasatch County property and accompanying water, to award
that property and accompanying water to Petitioner, Sandra Poll, nka Sandra Straub, as her
separate property.
Dated this/§L day of

/£&&&/

, 2010.
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Attorneys for Petitioner
226 West 2230 North
P.O. Box 657
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: (801) 375-3000
Fax:(801)375-3067
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE

SANDRA POLL, nka SANDRA STRAUB,
Petitioner,

Civil No. 094400044
Commissioner: Tom Patton
Judge: Fred Howard

v.
JAMES COOK POLL,
Respondent.

Based on the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed herewith, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The parties' partial stipulation as set forth in the Findings of Fact is reasonable

and acceptable, and is summarized hereafter.
It was stipulated during the second day of trial that the Petitioner's share of StimTrainer
would be endorsed to Mr. Poll, and certain items of other personal property and cash in the
amount of $13,950 would be delivered to Mr. Poll in satisfaction of his claims with respect to
personal property, the parties' vehicles, claims for moving expenses from Georgia to Utah, as
well as the Petitioner's rights as a shareholder in StimTrainer. The specific stipulation is set

1

forth beginning on page 5, line 9, of the Transcript dated 13 May, 2010, and summarized
hereafter:
a.

Mr. Poll is awarded the Toyota Tundra pick-up truck.

b.
Mr. Poll is awarded any and all interest that Ms. Poll may have in StimTrainer
Corporation, and Ms. Poll will endorse her stock certificates to Mr. Poll.
c.

Mr. Poll is entitled to have a third party pick up Mr. Poll's children's bedroom
Mr. Poll is not to go to Ms. Poll's home.

d.

Ms. Poll will pay Mr. Poll the sum of $13,950 within 14 days of the date of the

e.

Mr. Poll will hold Ms. Poll harmless for any of the moving costs from the move
from Georgia to Utah.

f.

A Mutual Restraining Order will enter between the parties and neither party will
harm, molest, harass, or otherwise interfering with the lives of the other.

g.

Mr. Poll is entitled to the following pre-marital property: Two racquetball rackets;
one gas weed eating trimmer; and one six foot step ladder.

h.

Mr. Poll is awarded the Georgia trailer.

i,

Ms. Poll retains the Toyota Avalon, and retains all right, title and interest in the
Avalon.

j.

Mr. Poll is awarded any other property, not specifically referenced in the
agreement, which is currently in his possession.

sets.

trial.

A portion of the transcript is set forth hereafter regarding the Wasatch County
property.
THE COURT: He concedes that she retains all right, title, and interest
to the Wasatch property.
MR. YOUNG: Right.
THE COURT: Excepting the right of appeal.
MR. HOWELL: Well, and the - yes. That is correct.

THE COURT: He is conceding his nominal interest here.
MR. HOWELL: Yes.
THE COURT: - - to her. But he is retaining his right of appeal on the
legal question.
MR. HOWELL: Yes. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 6 lines 15-25, page 7, line
1).
THE COURT: Excepting you are reserving your right of appeal on the
Wasatch property?
MR. YOUNG: Right.
MR. HOWELL: That is correct.
THE COURT: Okay. Is that - - any other corrections?
MR. YOUNG: I can't think of any.
MR. HOWELL: No, Your Honor. (Transcript dated May 12, 2010 page 8, lines 1118).
1.

Each party will pay their own attorney's fees.

m.

Each party is responsible for any debts incurred since the time of separation.

2.

The Wasatch County property and accompanying water are awarded to Petitioner,

Sandra Poll, nka Sandra Straub, as her separate property.
3.

Petitioner is awarded the Toyota Avalon and Chevrolet Suburban.

4.

Petitioner is awarded the three (3) St. Thomas Marriott International timeshares

and hold Mr. Poll harmless from any financial obligation.
Dated this /£_ day of

jfaj.te>/

2010.

NOTICE TO RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY, AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for respondent, will submit the
foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and
SUPPLEMENT DECREE, to the court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from
your receipt of this notice, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule
7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is hereby certified thatcopies of the same were mailed, via first-class mail, postage
prepaid, to the following this Jf day of July, 2010.
Matthew Howell
Attorney at Law
3301 N. University Avenue
Provo, UT 84604

BRENT D. YOUNG
H \COMMON\Brent\Dictation\Poll Sandra Order Doc
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D

Trial Court's Oral Ruling on May 12, 2010 That
Wasatch Property Is Separate Property

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. HOWELL:

3

THE COURT:

4

unnecessary.

5

Thank you.
Thank you.
Mr. Young, your arguments are

I f m prepared to make a decision.

Let me just say a couple of things in

6

observations.

7

have some empathy and sympathy for you in your position.

8

And I -- I don't know that I understand and appreciate

9

why this marriage has failed because you seem like

10

I have no criticism of the parties and I

decent, good people, and you have my respect.

11 J

I've tried to listen carefully to the evidence

12 J and I would make the following observations, among other
13

things.

A gift is generally thought of as a gratuitous,

14

voluntary conveyance without consideration and with

15

intention to make a gift.

16

definition but that's the theory.

There might be a better

17

What is undisputed in this case that I've

18

heard today is that the parties made a considerable

19

effort, and one which they continued throughout the

20 J course of their marriage, to keep their assets separate.
21

They did join them in terms of mutual operating expenses

22

such as groceries and household, but there was a

23

continued separation of their accounts.

24
25

Their -- there's a disagreement as -- as to
some of the facts regarding the transaction with the

Wasatch property.
The Plaintiff suggests that she paid no
attention to the title instruments.
The Defendant suggested that he was pleased to
find that it was in both names and that it was done at
her behest.
And now I have also the proffered testimony of
the realtor to suggest that it was done at her behest
and construction of fact that is rebutted by the
Plaintiff.

I don't have, absent that realtor, other

evidence that she made an unequivocal statement of her
intention to give the property.

And it is not uncommon

for parties to hold property in their -- in the title
for convenience purposes.
That being said, I don f t disagree with
Mr. Howell's argument about the Mortensen case in that
it offers a suggestion of an intention of a gift.
Therefore I would say, suggest to you that I
had thought that the -- that evidence is unpersuasive of
her intention to divide the property as a gift.

That

being said, however, the Court also observes the second
conveyance of, I think it was Exhibit 4, Exhibit 4, the
eight or nine months after.
What is more specific and more clear about
that testimony and evidence is that the Defendant, by

909

1

his own testimony, has explained the intention of the

2

parties by agreement to convey this property from his

3

estate for purposes of sheltering it from creditors with

4

the specific intent of getting it out of his estate and

5

putting it into hers.
They don f t offer any other testimony or

6
7

evidence that they intended to keep the property, enjoy

8

it mutually, or —

9

property.

or not -- not have it, as a separate

That, therefore, in my opinion, is stronger

10

evidence of an intention to keep the property separate

11

at that time.

12

I do not conclude that the parties did not

13

make considerable separate contributions to the

14

marriage, and they have been articulated to some degree

15

in terms of contributions to marital expenses, repair of

16

the Georgia house and whatnot.

17

And I also believe that they each made efforts

18

to protect the property, and in that sense the Defendant

19

may have some equitable interest in the property, but I

20

do not view that to be a large one.

21

rather nominal in comparison to the value of the

22

property as a whole, and I think that the Plaintiff made

23

like efforts.

24
25

I view that to be

And so I am concluding that this property is
separate.

ADDENDUM

E

Trial Court's Oral Supplementation on May 18,
2010 as to the Reasons for Its Ruling That the
Wasatch Property is Separate Property

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(In Chambers.)

3

THE COURT:

4

We'll go on the record.

This is

the Poll versus Poll case, 94400044.

5

At the Court's request I wanted to have a

6

brief conference with counsel.

7

present.

8

their clients or the parties.

I'll note Mr. Young is

Mr. Howell likewise is present, each without

9

What I wanted to do, break -- frankly, is

10

supplement the record with a few statements of the Court

11

as to the Court's reasoning.

12

this earlier but I was unable to get with you before

13

this hour.

But I thought it might be beneficial because

14

I didn't —

I don't know that I did an adequate job in

15

expressing the Court's reasoning.

And I had attempted to do

So let me make these

16 I observations, and then of course you can respond if you
17

think it is necessary or advised.

18

This has to do with the division of the

19 J Wasatch property or the claims regarding the Wasatch
20

property.

Among other things, the Court notes that the

21 J property was deeded from the sellers to the Plaintiff
22

and the Defendant.

The Defendant testified and asserted

23 I that the transfer was for joint marital purposes as he
24

described I think in his testimony.

And generally

25

speaking, I think the Plaintiff described that and

asserted that she didn ! t pay attention to the title.
I think it is undisputed that the Plaintiff
paid virtually for all of the Wasatch property from
premarital separate money of hers, and -- and then,
subsequently, I think it is undisputed that a second
title deed was executed.
The Defendant, regarding that second title
deed, intended —

my observation was that the Defendant

testified and asserted that he had talked to the
Plaintiff and determined to transfer title to the
Plaintiff because of fear of a possible legal claim or
action by, my recollection, his shareholder of
StimTrainer -- is it StimTrainer -- which was without
insurance and for whom for which he served as an officer
or director and had some exposure for personal
liability.

The Plaintiff testified words to the effect

that she did not care and was relieved to have title
returned to her, among other statements.

She said that.

My recollection is that there was little or no
testimony from the Defendant that, regarding that
transfer, that the parties agreed that the title, though
transferred to Plaintiff, the property would still
remain joint marital property in terms of specific
reference during that -- those discussions.
Now, I -- it is my view that by the

5

1

Defendant's testimony it is undisputed that his

2

characterization of the purpose of the transfer was to

3

protect the property from potential claims of

4

shareholders, and it would not be unreasonable to

5

conclude that that would constitute potentially a

6

fraudulent conveyance.

7

his —

8

Wasatch property and that the -- it would be the

9

separate property of Mrs. Poll for that purpose, then he

The title transfer reflects

his intention that his estate not include the

10

comes to court and seeks an equitable claim of one-half

11

of that property.
And the Court observes, and I just make

12
13

reference to a case that the Court had some years ago, I

14

don't have the citation but I think it is the case of

15

Holt versus Holt.

16

divorce proceeding.

17

action of property held by the Holt family in Pleasant

18

Grove.

It was a civil proceeding, not a
It had to do with the partition

19

And -- and it had -- it had may be not similar

20

circumstances, but analogous circumstances, in which the

21

property was conveyed from the father to his son for

22

purposes of avoiding a Medicaid lean.

23

heard -- and then the son refused to share the property

24

with other siblings when the father was deceased.

25

And the Court

The Court exercised its discretion and

1

required that division, and it went up on appeal and

2

they examined that matter.

3

apologize I don't have the —

4
5

This is my recollection.

I

the reference to that.

But the Court -- my opinion -- my belief is
that the court affirmed the notion that transfers with

6 I such intentions, and then notwithstanding those
7

objections, the sibling refused to transfer the property

8

to share with the other siblings, that the Court

9

affirmed the trial court's order that he could not --

10

should not be heard to complain under such circumstances

11 J because he seeks equity in light of those objectives.
12

So, that is this Court's opinion regarding

13

this property, that those intention -- given the

14

characterization of those intended -- of those

15 J intentions regarding the transfer, and the facts as I
16

have noted them, combined with the overall history of

17

the respective party marital economic contributions, and

18

then weighing the equities, I find it would not -- it

19

would be —

20

retain the property as her separate property.

21

I find it is not unjust for the Plaintiff to

So, I want to supplement the explanation to

22

suggest that given the characterization of a potential

23

fraudulent conveyance, as well as the equitable

24

relation —

25

history and contributions, that was the basis for the

the equitable position of the parties in

1

Court's decision.

And I didn't think I gave an adequate

2

explanation of that.

And so I supplement the record and

3 I invite your response.
4

MR. HOWELL:

Well

—

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. HOWELL:

7

disagrees with that position --

If any.
Okay.

Obviously, my client

8

THE COURT:

Disagrees.

9

MR. YOUNG:

-- for a couple of reasons.

10 J

One, as I understood the Court's explanation

11

of the Holt case, the transfer of property from one

12

holder to another for specific legal purposes did not

13

defeat the beneficial interests that others would have

14

in that property, and I think that's the situation here.

15

It was transferred for a specific legal purpose to

16

protect the asset from legal claims of shareholders or

17

others, but it would not defeat my client's beneficial

18

interest in that property, if I understood the

19

Court's

20
21

—
THE COURT:

No.

I actually think that is not

the ruling of Holt.

22

MR. HOWELL:

23

THE COURT:

Okay.
I think that he seeks —

the

24

suggestion is that his -- what might be viewed by some,

25

some -- I don't think it is an unreasonable conclusion,

given his characterization that that might constitute a
fraudulent conveyance, which would be contrary to the --*
an equitable claim that he makes -MR. HOWELL:
THE COURT:

Well, in my
—

and his —

—
and that, as well as

his intention to convey the property from his estate to
her separate estate, is evidence of his intention to
transfer the title.
MR. HOWELL:

In responding to that, it seems

to me, if it was indeed a fraudulent transfer,
effectively he hasn f t transferred it because that will
be brought -- if a claim comes against him and -- and is
held -- you know, if he is held liable and they need to
collect, they will be able to go after that property so
he effectively has not transferred.
THE COURT:

My understanding and opinion is it

is not necessary that it actually be effective.
MR. HOWELL:
THE COURT:
MR. HOWELL:

Okay.
You see what I f m saying?
And I do.

And I seem -- it seems

to me, that given the -- it was an ineffective transfer
for legal purposes, how could it possibly be considered
an effective transfer for beneficial purposes.
THE COURT:

I think the concept is it is not

clean hands analogy, that he comes to court with unclean

9

hands but seeks equitable relief.

And my understanding

and belief is that it is a discretionary standard and
under those circumstances he could not be held to
complain even if there had been no actual fraudulent
conveyance.
MR. HOWELL:
THE COURT:
MR. HOWELL:

Okay.
I am just explaining what I
And I understand.

—

And I am just

explaining my clients -THE COURT:

Okay.

That's fine.

You are

making your record.
MR. HOWELL:
THE COURT:
MR. HOWELL:

Yes.
Any other record you want to make?
On this particular issue, no.

THE COURT:

Mr. Young?

MR. YOUNG:

No, sir.

Oh, one thing.
administrative.

Yes.

And it is just

And if you'll indulge me for just a

minute.
The —

I remember being in Judge Harding's

court and Judge Bullock's court, and I remember them
each telling me the same thing when they had ruled for
my client or the other client, they would say "You are
to go through the record and you are to put every fact
in the findings" --

